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How emotions influence syllogistic reasoning is not well understood. fMRI was employed
to investigate the effects of induced positive or negative emotion on syllogistic reasoning.
Specifically, on a trial-by-trial basis participants were exposed to a positive, negative, or
neutral picture, immediately prior to engagement in a reasoning task. After viewing and
rating the valence and intensity of each picture, participants indicated by keypress whether
or not the conclusion of the syllogism followed logically from the premises.The content of
all syllogisms was neutral, and the influence of belief-bias was controlled for in the study
design. Emotion did not affect reasoning performance, although there was a trend in the
expected direction based on accuracy rates for the positive (63%) and negative (64%) ver-
sus neutral (70%) condition. Nevertheless, exposure to positive and negative pictures led
to dissociable patterns of neural activation during reasoning.Therefore, the neural basis of
deductive reasoning differs as a function of the valence of the context.
Keywords: reasoning, emotion, fMRI, IAPS, belief-bias, positive, negative
INTRODUCTION
Although the empirical literature examining the effects of emotion
on cognition is very large, relatively few studies have investigated
the effect of emotion on logical reasoning. Behavioral studies
that have investigated this effect have usually found that com-
pared to neutral valence, positive and negative valence result in
impaired accuracy in logical reasoning. This has been shown to
be true regardless of whether the emotions are manipulated via
the content of the logical arguments (Lefford, 1946), mood of
the participants (Melton, 1995; Oaksford et al., 1996), or both
(Blanchette and Richards, 2004; Blanchette, 2006). See also the
review by Blanchette and Richards (2010).
However, other studies have reported no impairment in cogni-
tive processing associated with negative emotion. In fact, sadness
and depression have been found to promote systematic cogni-
tive processing (Alloy and Abramson, 1979; Schwarz and Bless,
1991; Bless et al., 1992; Bohner et al., 1992; Edwards and Weary,
1993). Blanchette et al. (2007) found that reasoning in the negative
condition improved logical reasoning by reducing belief-bias, but
only when the material referred to participants’ actual exposure to
terrorist activity; otherwise, reasoning in the negative condition
was impaired, both for other participant groups on all negative
material and for the group exposed to actual terrorist activity on
non-terror-related negative material. Goel and Vartanian (2011)
found that, when argument logic and beliefs about the mater-
ial itself required opposite responses (incongruence) on a given
trial, reasoning performance was better when the reasoning mate-
rial was politically incorrect than when otherwise. These results
suggest that under some conditions negative content can improve
reasoning performance.
The inconsistency in the literature on the effect of emotion on
cognitive processes could arise from various sources, such as vari-
ations in the type of stimulus materials, incongruence between
argument logic and one’s beliefs about the content, or presenta-
tion of the emotion as either part of the content or separately, as
part of the context.
To extend this literature, we explored whether the effects of
emotion on underlying reasoning processes differ depending on
whether the emotion is positive or negative. This exploration
was motivated by evidence suggesting that positive and negative
emotions may exert different effects on cognition. Positive emo-
tion promotes creativity (Isen et al., 1987) and facilitates noticing
more relations among concepts (Isen and Daubman, 1984). It also
promotes a reliance on such heuristic shortcuts as source exper-
tise and stereotyping instead of considering the evidence when
making evaluations (Schwarz and Clore, 1983; Bless et al., 1992;
Bodenhausen et al., 1994). Positive emotion also impairs working
memory (Martin and Kerns, 2011), and distracts attention toward
task-irrelevant information (Biss and Hasher, 2011) at the level
of early sensory encoding (Vanlessen et al., 2013). The bulk of
available evidence suggests that positive emotion might exert its
deleterious effects on reasoning by taxing working memory with
induced bottom-up task-irrelevant information and by promoting
a top-down heuristic processing mode.
There is now good evidence to suggest that positive and nega-
tive emotion induction have different effects on the brain. Using
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a gender identification task (to reduce attention to the emotion
manipulation), Schmitz et al. (2009) found that positive emotion
broadened focus to peripherally presented stimuli (houses) and
was accompanied by neural activation in right lateral frontal pole
(BA 10), lateral orbitofrontal cortex (BA 11), as well as by corre-
lated activity in parahippocampal place area and primary visual
cortex. In contrast, negative emotion narrowed focus to targets
(faces) only, and was accompanied by neural activation in amyg-
dala, as well as by inversely correlated activity in parahippocampal
place area and primary visual cortex. In Schmitz et al. (2009), emo-
tion had been induced by means of pictures from the International
Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al., 1997). In Dolcos et al.
(2004), valence ratings of positive and negative IAPS pictures dur-
ing scanning were accompanied by different patterns of neural
activation; positive evaluations were associated with activation
in left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 8/9), whereas negative
evaluations were associated with activation in bilateral dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex (BA 8/9) and right ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex (BA 47). Using only negative IAPS pictures, Taylor et al.
(2000) found that activation in the amygdala, uncus, and anterior
parahippocampal gyrus was positively correlated with increas-
ingly aversive ratings of pictures; as well, mildly aversive ratings
were associated with activation in left-hemisphere posterior and
subcortical regions, whereas strongly aversive ratings were associ-
ated with activation in bilateral posterior and subcortical regions
and lateral orbitofrontal cortex. In general, the above reports sug-
gest that, apart from activation in orbitofrontal cortex, positive
and negative emotion induction lead to differentiated underlying
patterns of neural activity; positive emotion is accompanied by
medial frontal and left frontal activation, whereas negative emo-
tion is accompanied by activation in amygdala and bilateral or
right frontal activation. Patterns of activation in posterior cortical
and in subcortical regions (apart from amygdala) vary depending
on the task but, within these studies, differ by valence or intensity
of emotion.
In the first neuroimaging study to examine the effect of emotion
on deductive reasoning, Goel and Dolan (2003b) demonstrated
that reasoning with negatively charged material was associated
with activation in ventromedial prefrontal cortex, whereas rea-
soning with neutral material was associated with activation in left
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; furthermore, these neural mecha-
nisms were activated in a reciprocal manner. In that study, emo-
tion was manipulated using the content of the syllogism such
that, depending on the condition, content was either emotionally
provocative or neutral. The results demonstrated that the pat-
tern of neural activation during reasoning varies as a function of
emotional content.
In the present study, we sought to extend the findings of Goel
and Dolan (2003b) by making an important change to the par-
adigm. Whereas Goel and Dolan varied the emotionality of the
content itself, we chose to manipulate the emotionality of the con-
text in which reasoning about neutral material would take place.
Specifically, on each trial, participants first viewed and rated a pic-
ture on valence and intensity, and after the picture was removed
from view, they engaged in a syllogistic reasoning task involv-
ing visually presented syllogisms with non-emotional content.
This design feature enabled us to analyze the neural correlates of
reasoning separately from those acquired during emotion induc-
tion itself. Secondly, whereas the emotional content in Goel and
Dolan was negative and provocative, in the current study, we chose
to induce not only negative but also positive emotion.
Therefore, the current study utilized a 3 (Emotion)× 2 (Task)
within-subjects design, where the three levels of the Emotion fac-
tor were positive, neutral, and negative, and the two levels of the
Task factor were reasoning and baseline. Also, because it is known
that reasoning is subject to a belief-bias effect (Evans, 2003), we
controlled for belief-bias in the study design.
Because of the more common findings in the literature, that is,
that reasoning is impaired by positive or negative emotion manip-
ulation, we hypothesized that each of positive and negative emo-
tion would be detrimental to reasoning. Additionally, we hypoth-
esized that the neural systems underlying reasoning under those
two conditions would differ from that in the neutral condition.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Data were acquired from 16 participants (7 males, 9 females). Edu-
cation levels ranged from partially completed undergraduate study
to completed graduate degrees, with a mean of 17.54 (SD= 3.82)
years of education. Ages ranged from 19 to 56 (mean age was 28,
SD= 10 years). All participants gave informed consent. The study
was approved by the York University Research Human Participants
Ethics Committee.
STIMULI
Pictures, normed as to emotional valence, were taken from the
IAPS system (Lang et al., 1997). The valence categories from the
IAPS were used to choose 40 positive and 40 negative pictures for
the experiment. In addition, 40 pictures of furniture were added,
to serve as neutral pictures.
Reasoning stimuli consisted of 75 syllogisms that were emo-
tionally neutral in content. The arguments in 38 of these syllogisms
were logically valid, whereas the arguments in the remaining 37
were logically invalid. An example of a valid syllogism is “All dogs
are pets; All poodles are dogs; All poodles are pets,”and an example
of an invalid syllogism is “All paper is absorbent; All napkins are
paper; No napkins are absorbent.”
As well, there were 45 baseline “syllogisms,” in which the con-
cluding sentence was taken from a different syllogism in the
dataset, thereby ensuring that the conclusion of the baseline would
be unrelated to the content of the two premises. Thus, in a base-
line trial, the participant would prepare to respond to what was
expected to be a syllogism; however, the unrelated conclusion
would indicate that the stimulus is not an argument and can be
rejected without integrating the conclusion into the premises.
STUDY DESIGN
The study involved 120 trials delivered over 3 sessions (or “runs”)
in the scanner. Each trial involved the following sequence (see
Figure 1): first, the participant saw a slide with the fixation point
(xxx) for 500 ms; then the fixation point disappeared. Next, the
participant viewed a picture and pressed one of eight keys to
indicate simultaneously the rating of positive or negative valence
and the intensity of the picture’s emotional content. The specific
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FIGURE 1 | Design of one trial.
meaning of the keys will be explained below. Then, the picture
disappeared and a syllogism was presented over three consecutive
slides (slide one: first premise alone; slide two: first two premises
together; slide three: the two premises plus the conclusion). The
syllogism remained in view during the reasoning period. The par-
ticipant pressed a key to indicate whether the conclusion followed
or not from the two statements (premises). Disappearance of the
picture and syllogism slides was not entrained to the responses
but was timed to be in synchrony with the acquisition of the brain
scans. Trials varied in length and were approximately 16–20 s.
The specific meaning of the eight picture-rating keys is as fol-
lows: valence and intensity were captured in the same keypress.
There were four keys in one direction for “increasingly negative”
and four in the other direction for “increasingly positive.” The
side was counterbalanced among participants. Participants used
the index finger of each hand to respond. All participants were
declared as right-handed.
The effect of belief-bias was controlled for. That is, the rea-
soning syllogisms were balanced overall for validity and for con-
gruence between logic and beliefs. Congruence occurs when the
argument logic is valid and the conclusion is believable or when
the argument logic is invalid and the conclusion is unbelievable.
Incongruence occurs when the argument logic is valid and the
conclusion is unbelievable or when the argument logic is invalid
and the conclusion is believable.
Thus, syllogisms and baseline trials were matched to pictures
so that there were equivalent numbers of congruent syllogisms,
incongruent syllogisms, and baselines within each level of the
emotion factor (positive, negative, and neutral). Then the order of
the 120 trials was randomized. Finally, the trials were segregated
into three presentation sets of 40 trials each (see Supplemen-
tary Material). Thus, pictures were not presented in blocks by
valence; the valences (positive, neutral, and negative) were quasi-
randomly intermixed. The order of presentation of these three sets
was counterbalanced among participants, one set for each session
(“run”) in the scanner.
fMRI SCANNING TECHNIQUE
A 1.5-T Siemens VISION system (Siemens, Erlangen, Ger-
many) was used to acquire T1 anatomical volume images
(1 mm× 1 mm× 1.5 mm voxels) and T2*-weighted images
(64× 64, 3 mm× 3 mm pixels, TE= 40 ms), obtained with a
gradient echo-planar sequence using blood oxygenation level-
dependent (BOLD) contrast. Echo-planar images (2 mm thick)
were acquired axially every 3 mm, positioned to cover the whole
brain. Each volume was partitioned into 36 slices, obtained at
90 ms per slice. Data were recorded during a single acquisition
period. Volume (vol) images, 243 per session, were acquired con-
tinuously, for a total of 729 images over three sessions, with a
repetition time (TR) of 3.24 s/vol. The first six volumes in each
session were discarded (leaving 237 per session) to allow for T1
equilibration effects.
DATA ANALYSIS
Behavior
Behavioral data were analyzed using SPSS, version 16.0 (SPSS Inc.,
Chicago, IL, USA).
In the design there were 120 trials, 75 (62.5%) involving reason-
ing and 45 (37.5%) baselines. Data from two participants were dis-
carded because of movement artifacts in the neuroimaging data.
Therefore, the behavioral analyses are based on 14 participants.
Twelve participants completed all three sessions of 40 trials each.
One participant completed two sessions. One other participant
completed all three sessions, but because some of the scan volumes
were missing from the data, it was necessary to excise three trials
from the middle of Session 1 and one trial from the middle of Ses-
sion 2. Thus, there were a total of 12× 120+ 80+ 116= 1636 tri-
als. Of these, 1021 (62.4%) were reasoning trials and 615 (37.6%)
were baselines. The participants’ valence ratings were sorted into
three categories: positive, negative, and neutral. Ratings of −2,
−3, or −4 were classified as “negative”; ratings of +2, +3, or +4
were classified as “positive.” Ratings of −1 or+1 were considered
“neutral.”
Neuroimaging
The functional imaging data were preprocessed and subsequently
analyzed using Statistical Parametric Mapping SPM8 (Friston
et al., 1994; Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience;
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/).
All functional volumes were spatially realigned to the first vol-
ume. Data from two participants with head movement >2 mm
were discarded. All volumes were temporally realigned to the
AC–PC slice, to account for different sampling times of differ-
ent slices. A mean image created from the realigned volumes was
co-registered with the structural T1 volume and the structural vol-
umes spatially normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute
brain template (Evans et al., 1993) using non-linear basis functions
(Ashburner and Friston, 1999). The derived spatial transformation
was then applied to the realigned T2* volumes, which were finally
spatially smoothed with a 12 mm FWHM isotropic Gaussian ker-
nel in order to make comparisons across subjects and to permit
application of random field theory for corrected statistical infer-
ence (Worsley and Friston, 1995). The resulting time series across
each voxel were high-pass filtered with a cut-off of 128 s, using
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cosine functions to remove section-specific low-frequency drifts in
the BOLD signal. Global means were normalized by proportional
scaling to a grand mean of 100, and the time series temporally
smoothed with a canonical hemodynamic response function to
swamp small temporal autocorrelations with a known filter.
Condition effects at each voxel were estimated according to
the general linear model and regionally specific effects compared
using linear contrasts. Each contrast produced a statistical para-
metric map of the t statistic for each voxel, which was subsequently
transformed to a unit normal Z distribution. The BOLD signal
was modeled as a canonical hemodynamic response function with
time derivative. All events were modeled in the design matrix, but
events of no interest (the first two sentences, and the two motor
responses on a trial-by-trial basis) were modeled out. Positive,
neutral, and negative picture viewing/rating were each modeled
as an epoch from picture onset up to but excluding the motor
response. Positive, neutral, and negative reasoning, and positive,
neutral, and negative baseline were each modeled as an event. The
onset of the event was the halfway point between presentation of
the concluding sentence and the motor response.
Parametric (correlational) analyses were conducted to deter-
mine neural regions associated with increasingly intense positive
and negative picture ratings. The BOLD signal was modeled as a
canonical hemodynamic response function. All events were mod-
eled in the design matrix, but events of no interest (the three
sentences, and the two motor responses on a trial-by-trial basis)
were modeled out. Positive intensity and negative intensity were
each modeled as an event from picture onset.
The individual-level analyses involving emotion induction were
subsequently analyzed at the group level in a random effects
model, using t -tests (see Table 1 in Supplementary Material). The
individual-level analyses of the reasoning time window were ana-
lyzed at the group level in a random effects model, using a 2 (Task:
Reasoning, Baseline)× 3 Emotion (positive, negative, neutral) fac-
torial design, with correction for non-sphericity and with propor-
tional overall grand mean scaling (see Table 2 in Supplementary
Material).
All reported results survived a threshold of p< 0.005 and an
extent of k ≥ 20 voxels, a combination that has been demonstrated
to produce a desirable balance between type I and type II error rates
(Lieberman and Cunningham, 2009).
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
For each participant, we computed the proportion of each of pos-
itive:total ratings, neutral:total ratings, and negative:total ratings.
For example, one participant rated 119 of the 120 trials, of which
39 were rated neutral; therefore, for this participant, the propor-
tion of neutral:total ratings is 0.33. A repeated-measures analysis,
multivariate approach, was conducted; the within-subjects fac-
tor was choice of valence (positive, neutral, and negative) and
the dependent variable was mean proportion. Participants rated
a significantly greater proportion of pictures as positive than as
negative (F2,11= 9.988, p= 0.003, partial η2= 0.645).
The mean response time to rate the pictures was calculated for
each participant, separately for each valence. A repeated-measures
analysis, multivariate approach, was conducted; the within-
subjects factor was Emotion (positive, neutral, and negative) and
the dependent variable was mean picture-rating response time.
Data were analyzed for 13 participants, as 1 participant had
not rated any picture as “neutral.” Participants took significantly
longer to rate pictures as positive than as neutral (F2,11= 5.739,
p= 0.02, partial η2= 0.511).
The mean (SD) proportion of total picture ratings for each
valence was as follows: positive 0.3859 (0.108), neutral 0.2731
(0.130), negative 0.2308 (0.085); the mean (SD) response time
in milliseconds to rate the pictures was as follows: positive 2184
(483), neutral 1919 (623), negative 2092 (467). See “Behavioral
Scores” in Supplementary Material.
For the reasoning trials, the overall proportion of correct:total
responses was 0.630. For baselines (where the correct response
would always be “not valid”), the proportion of correct:total
responses was 0.972. Mean reaction time was 4185 (SD 789) ms on
reasoning trials overall (that is, without regard to accuracy), and
1874 (SD 456) ms on baseline trials. This difference was significant:
paired t (13)= 8.567, p= 0.001.
The proportion of correct reasoning responses to the total num-
ber of reasoning trials was computed for each participant within
each valence. For instance, 1 participant rated 20 of the pictures
(on reasoning trials) as positive, and reasoned logically on 15 of
those trials; thus, the proportion of correct responses on posi-
tively valenced reasoning trials was 0.75 for that participant. Next,
a repeated-measures analysis of variance (n= 13; the one par-
ticipant who had not rated any pictures as neutral was excluded
from this analysis), multivariate approach, was conducted to test
whether the valence rating affected reasoning. The independent
variable was the emotion factor (positive, neutral, and negative),
and the dependent variable consisted of each participant’s mean
proportion of correct:total reasoning responses. The result was not
significant (p= 0.391, partial η2= 0.157). Overall, the valence of
the picture did not significantly influence subsequent reasoning.
See “Behavioral Scores” in Supplementary Material.
A repeated-measures analysis of variance, multivariate
approach, indicated that mean reaction time to reasoning syllo-
gisms overall (that is, collapsed across accuracy) did not differ by
Emotion (positive, neutral, and negative). Participants responded
significantly more slowly on reasoning trials when their response
was incorrect than when it was correct, regardless of the valence
of the trial. The main effect of accuracy was significant: F(1,
12)= 7.537,p= 0.018, partialη2= 0.386; there was no main effect
of Emotion (positive versus negative) and no significant inter-
action of Accuracy× Emotion). Mean (SD) reaction times in
milliseconds to syllogisms, by valence and accuracy, were as fol-
lows: for correct responses (n= 13), mean (SD) was 3480 (574)
for positive, 3759 (729) for neutral, and 3793 (461) for negative.
For incorrect responses (n= 9), mean (SD) was 4215 (673) for
positive, 4199 (691) for neutral, and 4008 (755) for negative. For
the sake of consistency with the other results, we repeated this
analysis using correct trials only (repeated-measures, multivariate
approach), and found that mean reaction time when responding
correctly to syllogisms did not differ significantly by Emotion
(p= 0.267, partial η2= 0.213).
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Manipulation check demonstrating the need to control for
belief-bias
Instantiation of belief-bias in the current design would be as fol-
lows: on trials where there is incongruence between argument
logic and beliefs (valid argument and false belief, or invalid argu-
ment and true belief), responses should be less logical and slower
than on trials where there is congruence between argument logic
and beliefs (valid argument and true belief, or invalid argument
and false belief). We controlled for belief-bias in the study design,
by ensuring equivalent numbers of congruent syllogisms, incon-
gruent syllogisms, and baselines within each level of the emotion
factor.
We thank a reviewer for suggesting that we should test
directly this possible effect of belief-bias, at the behavioral
level. The proportion of correct:total responses was analyzed
for congruence with beliefs (congruent, incongruent) by Emo-
tion (positive, neutral, and negative) using a repeated-measures
analysis (multivariate approach). The main effect of Congru-
ence was significant (F1,12= 6.835, p= 0.023, partial η2= 0.363)
and the Congruence× Emotion interaction approached signifi-
cance (F2,11= 3.194, p= 0.081, partial η2= 0.367). Thus, correct
responding is significantly hindered when the logic of the argu-
ment conflicts with beliefs, tending to be more so (reduced to
chance level) after positive and negative than after neutral picture
ratings.
The mean proportions (SD) correct:total were as follows
(n= 13): for congruent syllogisms, positive:total was 0.727
(0.252), neutral:total was 0.729 (0.174), and negative:total was
0.762 (0.233). For incongruent syllogisms, positive:total was 0.537
(0.174), neutral:total was 0.659 (0.267), and negative:total was
0.504 (0.305).
The mean reaction time (RT) to the syllogisms where the
response was correct was analyzed for congruence with beliefs
(congruent, incongruent) by Emotion (positive, neutral, and neg-
ative) using a repeated-measures analysis (multivariate approach).
The main effect of Congruence was significant (F1,11= 39.740,
p< 0.001, partial η2= 0.783); the Congruence*Emotion inter-
action was not significant (p= 0.151, partial η2= 0.315). Thus,
correct responses are significantly slower when the logic of the
argument conflicts with beliefs, regardless of valence.
Mean reaction times (n= 12) when responding correctly were
as follows: (a) congruent positive: 3097 ms (SD 530); (b) congruent
neutral: 3437 ms (SD 532); (c) congruent negative: 3410 ms (SD
499); (d) incongruent positive: 3901 ms (SD 829); (e) incongru-
ent neutral: 3585 ms (SD 1077); (f) incongruent negative: 4466 ms
(SD 625).
NEUROIMAGING RESULTS
Neuroimaging analysis: emotion induction time window
As indicated in Table 1 of Supplementary Material, the contrast
positive–neutral yielded neural activation in left thalamus, right
cerebellum, occipital lobe bilaterally, left parietal (supramarginal
gyrus and secondary somatosensory area), right inferior pari-
etal lobe, and left fusiform gyrus. The contrast negative–neutral
yielded neural activation in left putamen, right amygdala, occip-
ital lobe bilaterally, left inferior parietal (secondary somatosen-
sory cortex and supramarginal gyrus), right inferior parietal
(supramarginal gyrus), and right inferior frontal gyrus (trian-
gularis, area 45). The contrast positive–negative yielded neural
activation in left cerebellum, right hippocampus, left postcen-
tral gyrus, and superior temporal gyrus bilaterally. The contrast
negative–positive yielded neural activation in left amygdala and
insula, left middle cingulate, right hippocampus, left occipital lobe,
inferior parietal (supramarginal gyrus) bilaterally, left superior
parietal (area 7), right precuneus, right postcentral gyrus, inferior
frontal gyrus (left opercularis area 44, right area 44), left frontal
(supplementary motor area and area 4), right precentral gyrus
(areas 44 and 6), and superior frontal gyrus bilaterally. See Table 1
in Supplementary Material.
Parametric (correlational) analyses were conducted to deter-
mine neural regions associated with increasingly intense positive
and negative picture ratings. As positive intensity increased, sig-
nificant neural activation was noted in cerebellum bilaterally, left
thalamus, occipital lobe bilaterally, postcentral gyrus bilaterally,
middle temporal gyrus bilaterally, right inferior temporal gyrus,
right fusiform gyrus, and left inferior frontal gyrus. See Table 1
in Supplementary Material and Figure 2A. As negative intensity
increased, significant neural activation was noted in right amyg-
dala, right occipital lobe, and right inferior frontal gyrus. See
Table 1 in Supplementary Material and Figures 2B,C.
Neuroimaging analysis: reasoning time window
Neural activations associated with the reasoning time window are
listed in Table 2 in Supplementary Material.
The contrast positive reasoning–positive baseline yielded
neural activation in right thalamus, right occipital lobe, left pari-
etal (supramarginal gyrus), right middle temporal gyrus, and
right precentral gyrus. The contrast negative reasoning–negative
baseline yielded neural activation in occipital lobe bilaterally, left
inferior parietal lobe (supramarginal gyrus), left postcentral gyrus,
left middle temporal gyrus, and left inferior frontal gyrus (triangu-
laris). The contrast positive reasoning–neutral reasoning yielded
activation in right inferior parietal (supramarginal gyrus). The
contrast negative reasoning–neutral reasoning yielded neural acti-
vation in inferior occipital lobe bilaterally, left superior parietal
lobe, left postcentral gyrus, right supramarginal gyrus, left inferior
temporal and right middle temporal gyrus, left hippocampus, left
middle frontal gyrus, and right frontal gyrus area 6. The contrast
positive reasoning–negative reasoning yielded neural activation
in left insula, right thalamus, superior temporal gyrus bilaterally,
and right inferior frontal gyrus (orbitalis). The contrast negative
reasoning–positive reasoning yielded significant neural activation
in caudate nucleus bilaterally, left insula, occipital lobe bilaterally,
left precuneus, and left postcentral gyrus.
To determine whether neural activation underlying reasoning
in the positive and neutral time windows would differ after remov-
ing baseline effects, we analyzed the interaction contrast [(positive
reasoning–positive baseline)− (neutral reasoning–neutral base-
line)]; this analysis yielded neural activation in left middle cin-
gulate, occipital lobe bilaterally, left inferior parietal lobe (angu-
lar gyrus), left intraparietal sulcus, right postcentral gyrus, left
precentral gyrus, and right supplementary motor area.
To determine whether neural activation underlying reason-
ing in the negative and neutral time windows would differ after
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FIGURE 2 | (A) As picture ratings increase in positive intensity, activation
increases in left inferior frontal gyrus (orbitalis) (MNI co-ordinates: −36, 24,
−8, k =310, Z =3.54) and other areas (see Table 1 in Supplementary
Material). As picture ratings increase in negative intensity, activation increases
in (B) right inferior frontal gyrus (triangularis: area 45; MNI co-ordinates: 52,
32, 10, k =57, Z =3.31) and in (C) right amygdala (MNI co-ordinates: 20, −6,
−16, k =744, Z =3.81), as well as other areas (see Table 1 in Supplementary
Material).
FIGURE 3 | A conjunction analysis demonstrated activation in
common between the positive and negative reasoning time
windows in (A) left postcentral gyrus (at the crosshair; MNI
co-ordinates: −32, −32, 58, k =122, Z =3.43) and intraparietal
sulcus (shown to the left of the crosshair in the coronal image;
MNI co-ordinates: −48, −36, 46, k =34, Z =2.78), and in (B) right
supplementary motor area (MNI co-ordinates: 6, −20, 50, k =226,
Z =3.34), as well as other areas (seeTable 2 in Supplementary
Material). Graphs show size of effect (beta) with 5% confidence
interval.
removing baseline effects, we analyzed the interaction contrast
[(negative reasoning–negative baseline)− (neutral reasoning–
neutral baseline)]; this analysis yielded neural activation in left
superior parietal, inferior parietal lobe (angular gyrus) bilaterally,
left inferior parietal (supramarginal gyrus), left postcentral gyrus,
left inferior frontal gyrus (triangularis), and right supplementary
motor area.
The interaction contrast [(neutral reasoning–neutral base-
line)− (positive reasoning–positive baseline)] yielded neural acti-
vation in right fusiform gyrus. The interaction contrast [(neu-
tral reasoning–neutral baseline)− (negative reasoning–negative
baseline)] yielded neural activation in right hippocampus.
To determine areas activated in common in the positive and
negative reasoning time window, we performed a conjunction
analysis of two interaction contrasts: [(positive reasoning–positive
baseline)− (neutral reasoning–neutral baseline)] and [(negative
reasoning–negative baseline)− (neutral reasoning–neutral base-
line)]. This conjunction analysis revealed neural activation in left
superior parietal lobe, left inferior parietal lobe (angular gyrus,
intraparietal sulcus, and supramarginal gyrus), left postcentral
gyrus, and right supplementary motor area (see Figure 3).
To directly compare neural activations in the positive and
negative reasoning time window, we conducted two inter-
action contrasts as follows. The interaction contrast [(posi-
tive reasoning–positive baseline)− (negative reasoning–negative
baseline)] yielded neural activation in cerebellum (vermis), right
superior parietal lobe, left fusiform gyrus, and right inferior frontal
gyrus (orbitalis) (see Figure 4). The interaction contrast [(neg-
ative reasoning–negative baseline)− (positive reasoning–positive
baseline)] yielded neural activation in left caudate nucleus, left
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FIGURE 4 | Neural activation associated with the positive reasoning time
window that is not shared with the negative reasoning time window
occurs in (A) left fusiform gyrus (MNI co-ordinates: −34, −6, −38, k =28,
Z =3.06), in (B) the vermis of the cerebellum (MNI co-ordinates: 0, −56,
−18, k =35, Z =2.9), in (C) right inferior frontal gyrus (orbitalis; MNI
co-ordinates: 42, 40, −14, k =428, Z =3.91), and in right superior parietal
lobe (not shown) (seeTable 2 in Supplementary Material). Graphs show
size of effect (beta) with 5% confidence interval.
FIGURE 5 | Neural activation associated with the negative reasoning
time window that is not shared with the positive reasoning time
window occurs in (A) left caudate nucleus (MNI co-ordinates: −10, 2,
20, k =594, Z =3.39) extending into left inferior frontal gyrus
(opercularis; MNI co-ordinates: −38, −8, 26, Z =3.35), in (B) right
middle temporal gyrus (relative deactivation; MNI co-ordinates: 44,
−62, 20, k =39, Z =2.86), in (C) right precentral gyrus (area 6; MNI
co-ordinates: 48, 0, 50, k =38, Z =2.85), as well as in left occipital lobe
(not shown) (SeeTable 2 in Supplementary Material). Graphs show
size of effect (beta) with 5% confidence interval.
occipital lobe, left inferior frontal gyrus (opercularis), and right
precentral gyrus, as well as relative deactivation in right middle
temporal gyrus (see Figure 5).
DISCUSSION
The above-chance reasoning accuracy levels indicate that partici-
pants were engaged in the task. The emotion manipulations were
also successful, as indicated by the variation in participants’ ratings
of picture valence.
EMOTION INDUCTION
Patterns of neural responses during picture viewing/rating were
consistent with those reported in the literature. As positive inten-
sity increased, activation was noted in the left inferior frontal
cortex. Likewise, Dolcos et al. (2004) reported neural activation
in frontal cortex, left hemisphere only, in association with the
rating of positive pictures. Furthermore, there is a trend in the
neuroimaging literature (Wager et al., 2003) for left-lateralization
in the frontal lobe associated with approach-related emotions1.
1Approach emotions include anger but are otherwise positive; none of our stimuli
were designed to induce anger.
During negative picture viewing/rating, activations in the con-
trast (negative picture–neutral picture) included right amyg-
dala and right inferior frontal gyrus. Activations in the con-
trast (negative picture–positive picture) included left amyg-
dala and inferior frontal gyrus bilaterally. As negative inten-
sity increased, activations were in right occipital, right amyg-
dala, and right inferior frontal gyrus. In Dolcos et al. (2004),
rating of negative pictures was associated with neural activa-
tion in bilateral frontal regions. In Taylor et al. (2000), ratings
of aversiveness of negative pictures were associated with neural
activation in amygdala, uncus, and anterior parahippocampus.
Neuroimaging studies of emotion perception (including studies
using the IAPS) often report activation in amygdala, parahip-
pocampal cortex, pregenual anterior cingulate, dorsal inferior
frontal gyrus, inferior temporal and occipital cortex, and lateral
cerebellum (Wager et al., 2008); withdrawal-related emotions2
are generally correlated with bilateral frontal activation (Mur-
phy et al., 2003) and with amygdala activation (Wager et al.,
2003).
2Withdrawal emotions are negative in valence.
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REASONING
Based on existing literature, we had hypothesized that both pos-
itive and negative emotion would be detrimental to subsequent
reasoning. We did not find a significant difference in either reason-
ing accuracy or mean reaction time among the positive, neutral,
and negative conditions. The Congruence*Emotion manipulation
check indicated that reasoning was impaired when beliefs and
logic were incongruent; however, we did not have the power to
explore this at the neural level, because of design choices we made
at the outset. Further study of this issue may be warranted (see
Supplementary Material).
There have been other studies showing that emotion does not
necessarily impair reasoning. Specifically, negative emotions have
not invariably been associated in the literature with impaired rea-
soning. Goel and Vartanian (2011) conducted a behavioral study
in which they manipulated the conflict between argument logic
and beliefs about the conclusion by introducing politically incor-
rect material; on incongruent trials (a valid argument with an
unbelievable conclusion, or an invalid argument with a believable
conclusion), reasoning performance was better when the state-
ment was politically incorrect than when otherwise. Blanchette
et al. (2007) found that reasoning in the negative condition (com-
pared to neutral) improved only when the reasoning material was
related to participants’actual exposure to terrorist activity, whereas
reasoning about other negative material was impaired.
Blanchette and Leese (2011) found no relation between rea-
soning performance and participant ratings of the intensity of
negative and neutral stimuli. It is intriguing to note a similarity
between their study and ours; Blanchette and Leese’s study may
be the first to link deductive reasoning with physiological arousal
(measured with transient skin conductance response) underly-
ing negative emotion induction, and ours may be the first study
using pictures from the IAPS to link deductive reasoning with
neural activation (measured using fMRI) underlying positive and
negative emotion induction. Blanchette and Leese found no rela-
tion between reasoning performance and participant ratings of
the intensity of negative and neutral stimuli, whereas our study
found no effect on reasoning performance of positive or negative
emotion induction in a design that included participant ratings.
Our main interest, reflected in our hypotheses, was to show
that the neural systems underlying reasoning in each of the posi-
tive and negative conditions would differ from those in the neutral
condition. These hypotheses were supported.
First, results indicated a crossover interaction, or double disso-
ciation, between the positive and neutral reasoning time windows
at the neural level. Not only did the interaction contrast [(positive
reasoning–positive baseline)− (neutral reasoning–neutral base-
line)] reveal activations but so also did the reverse interaction con-
trast [(neutral reasoning–neutral baseline)− (positive reasoning–
positive baseline)]. Thus, although reasoning after positive emo-
tion induction is not impaired, it is implemented at the neural
level differently than is neutral reasoning. The neural pattern asso-
ciated with the positive reasoning time window involves increased
activation in left middle cingulate, occipital lobes bilaterally, left
inferior parietal (angular gyrus), left intraparietal sulcus, right
postcentral gyrus, left precentral gyrus, and right supplementary
motor area.
A double dissociation indicates those neural regions implicated
in condition A but not in condition B, and simultaneously, those
neural regions implicated in condition B but not in condition A.
Therefore, it indicates that conditions A and B involve separable
systems.
Activation in the left inferior parietal lobe has been associ-
ated with abstract reasoning (Goel et al., 2000; Goel, 2009; Kuo
et al., 2009; Watson and Chatterjee, 2012). Activation in the left
angular gyrus has been associated with semantic meaning (Seghier
et al., 2010; Sharp et al., 2010), more so when there is a conflict
involving implausible sentences (Ye and Zhou, 2009) or when the
stimulus is emotional (Hervé et al., 2012); it is implicated also in
problem identification (Dandan et al., 2013b), in problem solv-
ing (Dandan et al., 2013a; Grabner et al., 2013), and in cognitive
flexibility (Jacobson et al., 2011). Activation in intraparietal sul-
cus has been associated with item-specific processing but not with
relations among items (Ackerman and Courtney, 2012), with sym-
bolic number processing (Bugden et al., 2012), with attention to
items presented in the periphery (Gillebert et al., 2013), and with
temporal orienting (that is, attention toward a specific moment
in time; Davranche et al., 2011). Left frontal precentral gyrus has
been associated with the interaction of attention and language
comprehension (Kristensen et al., 2013), with syntax complexity
and post hoc reanalysis of sentence comprehension (Meltzer et al.,
2010), and with successful inhibitory control (Padmala and Pes-
soa, 2010). Activation in postcentral gyrus has been associated with
the illusory perception of motion (Planetta and Servos, 2012), and
with visceral stimulation (Hojo et al., 2012; Kaplan and Meyer,
2012). The right frontal supplementary motor area has been asso-
ciated with speeded decision-making (Wenzlaff et al., 2011), with
attention maintenance (Kristensen et al., 2013), and is considered
to be part of a ventral attention network that mediates bottom-up
capture of attention by memory (Burianová et al., 2012).
Secondly, results indicated a crossover interaction, or dou-
ble dissociation, between the negative and neutral reasoning
time windows at the neural level. Not only did the interac-
tion contrast [(negative reasoning–negative baseline)− (neutral
reasoning–neutral baseline)] reveal activations but so also did
the reverse interaction contrast [(neutral reasoning–neutral base-
line)− (negative reasoning–negative baseline)]. Thus, although
reasoning after negative emotion induction is not impaired, it is
implemented at the neural level differently than is neutral rea-
soning. The neural pattern associated with the negative reasoning
time window involves left postcentral gyrus, left inferior parietal
(supramarginal gyrus), left superior parietal lobe, inferior parietal
(angular gyrus) bilaterally, left inferior frontal gyrus, and right
supplementary motor area.
As mentioned above, activation in postcentral gyrus has been
associated with the illusory perception of motion and with vis-
ceral stimulation. Left supramarginal gyrus is considered to be
part of a ventral attention network (Corbetta et al., 2008) that
mediates bottom-up capture of attention by memory (Burianová
et al., 2012). Superior parietal lobe is involved in the interaction
between language processing and the control of movement (Segal
and Petrides, 2012); activation has been associated with syllogis-
tic reasoning involving abstract or incongruent materials (Tsujii
et al., 2011). As mentioned above, activation in the left inferior
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parietal lobe has been associated with abstract reasoning; activa-
tion in the left angular gyrus has been associated with semantic
meaning, more so when there is a conflict involving implausi-
ble sentences or when the stimulus is emotional, with problem
identification and problem solving, and with cognitive flexibility.
Activation in the left inferior frontal region has been associated
with semantic integration (Yu et al., 2011; Huang et al., 2012) and
with categorization (Lupyan et al., 2012; Philipp et al., 2013). As
mentioned above, activation in the right supplementary motor
area has been associated with speeded decision-making and with
attention maintenance, and is considered to be part of a ventral
attention network that mediates bottom-up capture of attention
by memory.
The positive and negative reasoning time windows yielded
similar activation in left superior parietal, left inferior parietal
(angular gyrus, intraparietal sulcus, and supramarginal gyrus),
left postcentral gyrus, and right supplementary motor area. This
finding emerged from a conjunction analysis of two interac-
tion contrasts: [(positive reasoning–positive baseline)− (neutral
reasoning–neutral baseline)] and [(negative reasoning–negative
baseline)− (neutral reasoning–neutral baseline)].
Beyond these similarities, however, results indicated a crossover
interaction, or double dissociation, between the positive and
negative reasoning time windows at the neural level. Not
only did the interaction contrast [(positive reasoning–positive
baseline)− (negative reasoning–negative baseline)] reveal acti-
vations but so also did the reverse interaction contrast [(neg-
ative reasoning–negative baseline)− (positive reasoning–positive
baseline)].
The interaction favoring the positive reasoning time window
revealed activation in right inferior frontal (orbitalis, or BA 47),
right superior parietal, cerebellar vermis, and left fusiform. In the
literature, activation in right frontal (BA 47) has been noted in
unconstrained hypothesis generation (Vartanian and Goel, 2005).
As mentioned above, superior parietal lobe is involved in the
interaction between language processing and the control of move-
ment. The cerebellar vermis is involved in autonomic and motor
responses to an emotional state (Strata et al., 2011). Activation
in left fusiform has been involved in lexico-semantic processing
(Tsapkini and Rapp, 2010; Thesen et al., 2012).
The interaction favoring the negative reasoning time window
revealed activation in left caudate nucleus, left inferior frontal
(opercularis, or BA 44), left occipital lobe, and right precentral
gyrus, as well as relative deactivation in right middle temporal
gyrus. In the literature, caudate nucleus has been shown to have
a crucial role in reasoning (Melrose et al., 2007) unless insuffi-
cient processing time has been allotted for reasoning (Kalbfleisch
et al., 2007). Activation in left inferior frontal (BA 44) is associ-
ated more with phonological than with semantic fluency (Katzev
et al., 2013). Right precentral gyrus is implicated in the represen-
tation of coordinated hand–mouth movements (Desmurget et al.,
2014) and the neural coding of oculomotor and somatomotor
space (Iacoboni et al., 1997). Activation in right middle temporal
lobe has been associated with verbal fluency (Krug et al., 2011)
and with semantic priming (Laufer et al., 2011).
Goel and Dolan (2003b) had manipulated emotion using the
content of the syllogism such that content was either emotionally
provocative or neutral; they found that reasoning with negatively
charged material was associated with activation in ventrome-
dial prefrontal cortex, whereas reasoning with neutral material
was associated with activation in left dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex. We have extended their findings by manipulating emotion
separately from the material itself. Our emotion manipulation
provides an emotional context in which to reason about neutral
material, rather than providing emotional content. Therefore, it
is not surprising that our findings differ from those in Goel and
Dolan (2003b). Reasoning in an emotional but unrelated con-
text involves a different neural underpinning than does reasoning
about emotional content.
The fact that we found neural level differences in reason-
ing, despite a lack of behavioral difference, suggests that the
neural systems underlying reasoning are sensitive to neural sys-
tems previously recruited by emotional context, and can to some
extent compensate for these effects of emotions. It is possible that
the behavioral manifestations (that is, impairment of reasoning)
emerge only when the system is stressed.
In summary, we had predicted that both positive and neg-
ative emotion would be detrimental to reasoning, and that the
neural systems underlying reasoning under those two conditions
would differ from that in the neutral condition. We found that,
although neither positive nor negative emotional context signif-
icantly impaired reasoning performance, positive and negative
context did have dissociable effects on the underlying neural
mechanisms involved in reasoning.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This study was funded by a Wellcome Trust Grant (ABH00
FA032YBH064) to Vinod Goel.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online at
http://www.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00736/
abstract
REFERENCES
Ackerman, C. M., and Courtney, S. M. (2012). Spatial relations and spatial loca-
tions are dissociated within prefrontal and parietal cortex. J. Neurophysiol. 108,
2419–2429. doi:10.1152/jn.01024.2011
Alloy, L. B., and Abramson, L. Y. (1979). Judgment of contingency in depressed
and nondepressed students: sadder but wiser? J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 108, 441–485.
doi:10.1037/0096-3445.108.4.441
Ashburner, J., and Friston, K. J. (1999). Nonlinear spatial normalization using basis
functions. Hum. BrainMapp. 7, 254–266. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1097-0193(1999)7:
4<254::AID-HBM4>3.0.CO;2-G
Biss, R. K., and Hasher, L. (2011). Delighted and distracted: positive affect
increases priming for irrelevant information. Emotion 11, 1474–1478. doi:10.
1037/a0023855
Blanchette, I. (2006). The effect of emotion on interpretation and logic in a condi-
tional reasoning task. Mem. Cognit. 34, 1112–1125. doi:10.3758/BF03193257
Blanchette, I., and Leese, J. (2011). The effect of negative emotion on deductive
reasoning: examining the contribution of physiological arousal. Exp. Psychol. 58,
235–246. doi:10.1027/1618-3169/a000090
Blanchette, I., and Richards, A. (2004). Reasoning about emotional and neutral
materials: is logic affected by emotion? Psychol. Sci. 15, 745–752. doi:10.1111/j.
0956-7976.2004.00751.x
Blanchette, I., and Richards, A. (2010). The influence of affect on higher level cog-
nition: a review of research on interpretation, judgement, decision making and
reasoning. Cogn. Emot. 24, 561–595. doi:10.1080/02699930903132496
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org September 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 736 | 9
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Smith et al. Emotion modulates subsequent reasoning: fMRI
Blanchette, I., Richards, A., Melnyk, L., and Lavda, A. (2007). Reasoning about emo-
tional contents following shocking terrorist attacks: a tale of three cities. J. Exp.
Psychol. Appl. 13, 47–56. doi:10.1037/1076-898X.13.1.47
Bless, H., Mackie, D. M., and Schwarz, N. (1992). Mood effects on attitude judg-
ments: independent effects of mood before and after message elaboration. J. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. 63, 585–595. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.63.4.585
Bodenhausen, G. V., Kramer, G. P., and Susser, K. (1994). Happiness and stereotypic
thinking in social judgment. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 66, 621–632. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.66.4.621
Bohner, G., Crow, K., Erb, H.-P., and Schwarz, N. (1992). Affect and persuasion:
mood effects on the processing of message content and context cues and on
subsequent behaviour. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 22, 511–530. doi:10.1002/ejsp.
2420220602
Bugden, S., Price, G. R., McLean, D. A., and Ansari, D. (2012). The role of the
left intraparietal sulcus in the relationship between symbolic number process-
ing and children’s arithmetic competence. Dev. Cogn. Neurosci. 2, 448–457.
doi:10.1016/j.dcn.2012.04.001
Burianová, H., Ciaramelli, E., Grady, C. L., and Moscovitch, M. (2012). Top-down
and bottom-up attention-to-memory: mapping functional connectivity in two
distinct networks that underlie cued and uncued recognition memory. Neuroim-
age 63, 1343–1352. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.07.057
Corbetta, M., Patel, G., and Shulman, G. L. (2008). The reorienting system of
the human brain: from environment to theory of mind. Neuron 58, 306–324.
doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2008.04.017
Dandan, T., Haixue, Z., Wenfu, L., Wenjing, Y., Jiang, Q., and Qinglin, Z. (2013a).
Brain activity in using heuristic prototype to solve insightful problems. Behav.
Brain Res. 253, 139–144. doi:10.1016/j.bbr.2013.07.017
Dandan, T., Wenfu, L., Tianen, D., Nusbaum, H. C., Jiang, Q., and Qinglin, Z.
(2013b). Brain mechanisms of valuable scientific problem finding inspired by
heuristic knowledge. Exp. Brain Res. 228, 437–443. doi:10.1007/s00221-013-
3575-4
Davranche, K., Nazarian, B., Vidal, F., and Coull, J. (2011). Orienting attention in
time activates left intraparietal sulcus for both perceptual and motor task goals.
J. Cogn. Neurosci. 23, 3318–3330. doi:10.1162/jocn_a_00030
Desmurget, M., Richard, N., Harquel, S., Baraduc, P., Szathmari, A., Mottolese, C.,
et al. (2014). Neural representations of ethologically relevant hand/mouth syner-
gies in the human precentral gyrus. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 111, 5718–5722.
doi:10.1073/pnas.1321909111
Dolcos, F., LaBar, K. S., and Cabeza, R. (2004). Dissociable effects of arousal and
valence on prefrontal activity indexing emotional evaluation and subsequent
memory: an event-related fMRI study. Neuroimage 23, 64–74. doi:10.1016/j.
neuroimage.2004.05.015
Edwards, J. A., and Weary, G. (1993). Depression and the impression-formation con-
tinuum: piecemeal processing despite the availability of category information. J.
Pers. Soc. Psychol. 64, 636–645. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.64.4.636
Eickhoff, S., Stephan, K. E., Mohlberg, H., Grefkes, C., Fink, G. R., Amunts,
Z., et al. (2005). A new SPM toolbox for combining probabilistic cytoar-
chitectonic maps and functional imaging data. Neuroimage 25, 1325–1335.
doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.12.034
Evans, A. C., Collins, D. L., Mills, S. R., Brown, E. D., Kelly, R. L., and Peters, T. M.
(1993). “3D statistical neuroanatomical models from 305 MRI volumes,” in IEEE
Conference Record, Nuclear Science Symposium and Medical Imaging Conference,
Vol. 3 (San Francisco, CA: IEEE), 1813–1817.
Evans, J. S. (2003). In two minds: dual-process accounts of reasoning. Trends Cogn.
Sci. 7, 454–459. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2003.08.012
Friston, K. J., Holmes, A. P., Worsley, K. J., Poline, J.-P., Frith, C. D., and
Frackowiak, R. S. J. (1994). Statistical parametric maps in functional imag-
ing: a general linear approach. Hum. Brain Mapp. 2, 189–210. doi:10.1002/hbm.
460020402
Genovese, C. R., Lazar, N. A., and Nichols, T. (2002). Thresholding of statistical
maps in functional neuroimaging using the false discovery rate. NeuroImage 15,
870–878. doi:10.1006/nimg.2001.1037
Gillebert, C. R., Caspari, N., Wagemans, J., Peeters, R., Dupont, P., and Vanden-
berghe, R. (2013). Spatial stimulus configuration and attentional selection:
extrastriate and superior parietal interactions. Cereb. Cortex 23, 2840–2854.
doi:10.1093/cercor/bhs263
Goel, V. (2009). “Fractionating the system of deductive reasoning,” in Neural Corre-
lates of Thinking, eds E. Kraft, B. Guylas, and E. Poppel (New York, NY: Springer
Press), 203–218.
Goel, V., Buchel, C., Frith, C., and Dolan, R. (2000). Dissociation of mechanisms
underlying syllogistic reasoning. Neuroimage 12, 504–514. doi:10.1006/nimg.
2000.0636
Goel, V., and Dolan, R. J. (2003a). Explaining modulation of reasoning by belief.
Cognition 87, B11–B22. doi:10.1016/S0010-0277(02)00185-3
Goel, V., and Dolan, R. J. (2003b). Reciprocal neural response within lateral and
ventral medial prefrontal cortex during hot and cold reasoning. Neuroimage 20,
2314–2341. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2003.07.027
Goel, V., and Vartanian, O. (2011). Negative emotions can attenuate the influ-
ence of beliefs on logical reasoning. Cogn. Emot. 25, 121–131. doi:10.1080/
02699931003593942
Grabner, R. H., Ansari, D., Koschutnig, K., Reishofer, G., and Ebner, F. (2013). The
function of the left angular gyrus in mental arithmetic: evidence from the associa-
tive confusion effect. Hum. Brain Mapp. 34, 1013–1024. doi:10.1002/hbm.21489
Hervé, P. Y., Razafimandimby, A., Vigneau, M., Mazoyer, B., and Tzourio-Mazoyer,
N. (2012). Disentangling the brain networks supporting affective speech com-
prehension. Neuroimage 61, 1255–1267. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.03.073
Hojo, M., Takahashi, T., Nagahara, A., Sasaki, H., Oguro, M., Asaoka, D., et al. (2012).
Analysis of brain activity during visceral stimulation. J. Gastroenterol. Hepatol.
27(Suppl. 3), 49–52. doi:10.1111/j.1440-1746.2012.07072.x
Huang, J., Zhu, Z., Zhang, J. X., Wu, M., Chen, H. C., and Wang, S. (2012). The role
of left inferior frontal gyrus in explicit and implicit semantic processing. Brain
Res. 1440, 56–64. doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2011.11.060
Iacoboni, M., Woods, R. P., Lenzi, G. L., and Mazziotta, J. C. (1997). Merging of ocu-
lomotor and somatomotor space coding in the human right precentral gyrus.
Brain 120, 1635–1645. doi:10.1093/brain/120.9.1635
Isen, A. M., and Daubman, K. A. (1984). The influence of affect on categorization.
J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 47, 1206–1217. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.47.6.1206
Isen, A. M., Daubman, K. A., and Nowicki, G. P. (1987). Positive affect facilitates
creative problem solving. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 52, 1122–1131. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.52.6.1122
Jacobson, S. C., Blanchard, M., Connolly, C. C., Cannon, M., and Garavan, H. (2011).
An fMRI investigation of a novel analogue to the trail-making test. Brain Cogn.
77, 60–70. doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2011.06.001
Kalbfleisch, M. L., Van Meter, J. W., and Zeffiro, T. A. (2007). The influences of task
difficulty and response correctness on neural systems supporting fluid reasoning.
Cogn. Neurodyn. 1, 71–84. doi:10.1007/s11571-006-9007-4
Kaplan, J. T., and Meyer, K. (2012). Multivariate pattern analysis reveals common
neural patterns across individuals during touch observation. Neuroimage 60,
204–212. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.12.059
Katzev, M., Tüscher, O., Hennig, J., Weiller, C., and Kaller, C. P. (2013). Revisit-
ing the functional specialization of left inferior frontal gyrus in phonological
and semantic fluency: the crucial role of task demands and individual ability. J.
Neurosci. 33, 7837–7845. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3147-12.2013
Kristensen, L. B., Wang, L., Petersson, K. M., and Hagoort, P. (2013). The interface
between language and attention: prosodic focus marking recruits a general atten-
tion network in spoken language comprehension. Cereb. Cortex 23, 1836–1848.
doi:10.1093/cercor/bhs164
Krug, A., Markov, V., Krach, S., Jansen, A., Zerres, K., Eggermann, T., et al. (2011).
Genetic variation in G72 correlates with brain activation in the right mid-
dle temporal gyrus in a verbal fluency task. Hum. Brain Mapp. 32, 118–126.
doi:10.1002/hbm.21005
Kuo, W.-J., Sjöström, T., Chen,Y.-P., Wang,Y.-H., and Huang, C.-Y. (2009). Intuition
and deliberation: two systems for strategizing in the brain. Science 324, 519–522.
doi:10.1126/science.1165598
Lang, P. J., Bradley, M. M., and Cuthberg, B. N. (1997). International Affective Picture
System [Pictures]. Gainesville, FL: NIMH Center for the Study of Emotion and
Attention.
Laufer, I., Negishi, M., Lacadie, C. M., Papademetris, X., and Constable, R. T. (2011).
Dissociation between the activity of the right middle frontal gyrus and the
middle temporal gyrus in processing semantic priming. PLoS ONE 6:e22368.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022368
Lefford, A. (1946). The influence of emotonal subject matter on logical reasoning.
J. Gen. Psychol. 34, 127–151. doi:10.1080/00221309.1946.10544530
Lerner, J. S., Gonzalez, R. M., Small, D. A., and Fischhoff, B. (2003). Effects of fear
and anger on perceived risks of terrorism: a national field experiment. Psychol.
Sci. 14, 144–150. doi:10.1111/1467-9280.01433
Lerner, J. S., and Keltner, D. (2001). Fear, anger, and risk. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 81,
146–159. doi:10.1037//O022-3514.81.1.146
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org September 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 736 | 10
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Smith et al. Emotion modulates subsequent reasoning: fMRI
Lieberman, M. D., and Cunningham, W. A. (2009). Type I and type II error concerns
in fMRI research: re-balancing the scale. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 4, 423–428.
doi:10.1093/scan/nsp052
Lupyan, G., Mirman, D., Hamilton, R., and Thompson-Schill, S. L. (2012). Cat-
egorization is modulated by transcranial direct current stimulation over left
prefrontal cortex. Cognition 124, 36–49. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2012.04.002
Martin, E. A., and Kerns, J. G. (2011). The influence of positive mood on different
aspects of cognitive control. Cogn. Emot. 25, 265–279. doi:10.1080/02699931.
2010.491652
Melrose, R. J., Poulin, R. M., and Stern, C. E. (2007). An fMRI investigation
of the role of the basal ganglia in reasoning. Brain Res. 1142, 146–158.
doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2007.01.060
Melton, R. J. (1995). The role of positive affect in syllogism performance. Pers. Soc.
Psychol. Bull. 21, 788–794. doi:10.1177/0146167295218001
Meltzer, J. A., McArdle, J. J., Schafer, R. J., and Braun, A. R. (2010). Neural aspects
of sentence comprehension: syntactic complexity, reversibility, and reanalysis.
Cereb. Cortex 20, 1853–1864. doi:10.1093/cercor/bhp249
Murphy, F. C., Nimmo-Smith, I., and Lawrence, A. D. (2003). Functional neu-
roanatomy of emotions: a meta-analysis. Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 3,
207–233. doi:10.3758/CABN.3.3.207
Oaksford, M., Morris, F., Grainger, B., and Williams, J. M. G. (1996). Mood, rea-
soning, and central executive processes. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 22,
476–492. doi:10.1016/B978-0-444-53702-7.00007-5
Padmala, S., and Pessoa, L. (2010). Interactions between cognition and motiva-
tion during response inhibition. Neuropsychologia 48, 558–565. doi:10.1016/j.
neuropsychologia.2009.10.017
Philipp, A. M., Weidner, R., Koch, I., and Fink, G. R. (2013). Differential roles of infe-
rior frontal and inferior parietal cortex in task switching: evidence from stimulus-
categorization switching and response-modality switching. Hum. Brain Mapp.
34, 1910–1920. doi:10.1002/hbm.22036
Planetta, P. J., and Servos, P. (2012). The postcentral gyrus shows sustained fMRI
activation during the tactile motion aftereffect. Exp. Brain Res. 216, 535–544.
doi:10.1007/s00221-011-2957-8
Schmitz, T. W., De Rosa, E., and Anderson, A. K. (2009). Opposing influences of
affective state valence on visual cortical encoding. J. Neurosci. 29, 7199–7207.
doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5387-08.2009
Schwarz, N., and Bless, H. (1991). “Happy and mindless, but sad and smart? The
impact of affective states on analytic reasoning,” in Emotion and Social Judgments,
ed. J. P. Forgas (Oxford: Pergamon Press), 55–71.
Schwarz, N., and Clore, G. L. (1983). Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-
being: informative and directive functions of affective states. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.
45, 513–523. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.45.3.513
Segal, E., and Petrides, M. (2012). The anterior superior parietal lobule and its
interactions with language and motor areas during writing. Eur. J. Neurosci. 35,
309–322. doi:10.1111/j.1460-9568.2011.07937.x
Seghier, M. L., Fagan, E., and Price, C. J. (2010). Functional subdivisions in the left
angular gyrus where the semantic system meets and diverges from the default
network. J. Neurosci. 30, 16809–16817. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3377-10.2010
Sharp, D. J., Awad, M., Warren, J. E., Wise, R. J., Vigliocco, G., and Scott, S. K. (2010).
The neural response to changing semantic and perceptual complexity during
language processing. Hum. Brain Mapp. 31, 365–377. doi:10.1002/hbm.20871
Strata, P., Scelfo, B., and Sacchetti, B. (2011). Involvement of cerebellum in emotional
behavior. Physiol. Res. 60(Suppl. 1), S39–S48.
Taylor, S. F., Liberzon, I., and Koeppe, R. A. (2000). The effect of graded aver-
sive stimuli on limbic and visual activation. Neuropsychologia 38, 1415–1425.
doi:10.1016/S0028-3932(00)00032-4
Thesen, T., McDonald, C. R., Carlson, C., Doyle, W., Cash, S., Sherfey, J., et al. (2012).
Sequential then interactive processing of letters and words in the left fusiform
gyrus. Nat. Commun. 3, 1284. doi:10.1038/ncomms2220
Tsapkini, K., and Rapp, B. (2010). The orthography-specific functions of the
left fusiform gyrus: evidence of modality and category specificity. Cortex 46,
185–205. doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2009.02.025
Tsujii, T., Sakatani, K., Masuda, S., Akiyama, T., and Watanabe, S. (2011). Evaluating
the roles of the inferior frontal gyrus and superior parietal lobule in deductive
reasoning: an rTMS study. Neuroimage 58, 640–646. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.
2011.06.076
Vanlessen, N., Rossi, V., De Raedt, R., and Pourtois, G. (2013). Positive emotion
broadens attention focus through decreased position-specific spatial encoding
in early visual cortex: evidence from ERPs. Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 13,
60–79. doi:10.3758/s13415-012-0130-x
Vartanian, O., and Goel,V. (2005). Task constraints modulate activation in right ven-
tral lateral prefrontal cortex.Neuroimage 27, 927–933. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.
2005.05.016
Wager, T. D., Barrett, L. F., Bliss-Moreau, E., Lindquist, K. A., Duncan, S., Kober, H.,
et al. (2008). “The neuroimaging of emotion,” in Handbook of Emotions, eds M.
Lewis, J. M. Haviland-Jones, and L. F. Barrett (New York, NY: Guilford Press),
249–271.
Wager, T. D., Phan, K. L., Liberzon, I., and Taylor, S. F. (2003). Valence, gender, and
lateralization of functional brain anatomy in emotion: a meta-analysis of find-
ings from neuroimaging. Neuroimage 19, 513–531. doi:10.1016/S1053-8119(03)
00078-8
Watson, C. E., and Chatterjee, A. (2012). A bilateral frontoparietal network under-
lies visuospatial analogical reasoning. Neuroimage 59, 2831–2838. doi:10.1016/j.
neuroimage.2011.09.030
Wenzlaff, H., Bauer, M., Maess, B., and Heekeren, H. R. (2011). Neural character-
ization of the speed-accuracy tradeoff in a perceptual decision-making task. J.
Neurosci. 31, 1254–1266. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4000-10.2011
Worsley, K. J., and Friston, K. J. (1995). Analysis of fMRI time-series revisited – again.
Neuroimage 2, 173–181. doi:10.1006/nimg.1995.1023
Ye, Z., and Zhou, X. (2009). Conflict control during sentence comprehension: fMRI
evidence. Neuroimage 48, 280–290. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.06.032
Yu, T., Lang, S., Birbaumer, N., and Kotchoubey, B. (2011). Listening to factually
incorrect sentences activates classical language areas and thalamus. Neuroreport
22, 865–869. doi:10.1097/WNR.0b013e32834b6fc6
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was conducted
in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed
as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 16 May 2014; accepted: 02 September 2014; published online: 23 September
2014.
Citation: Smith KW,Vartanian OandGoel V (2014)Dissociable neural systems under-
write logical reasoning in the context of induced emotions with positive and negative
valence. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:736. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00736
This article was submitted to the journal Frontiers in Human Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2014 Smith,Vartanian andGoel. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, dis-
tribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s)
or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in
accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is
permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org September 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 736 | 11
